Files
Heimdall/app/Http/Middleware/TrustHosts.php
T
KodeStar 881533baa5 Harden against host header injection and open redirect
Heimdall trusted the incoming X-Forwarded-Host header for URL generation, so
a spoofed value poisoned the page base href, asset() URLs and redirect
targets - loading assets from and redirecting to an attacker-controlled host
(CVE-2025-50578).

- TrustProxies no longer trusts X-Forwarded-Host; a forged value can no longer
  influence getHost(), url(), asset() or redirects. X-Forwarded-For/Port/Proto
  handling is unchanged.
- Trusted proxies are now configurable via the TRUSTED_PROXIES env var
  (comma-separated CIDRs/IPs, "*" to trust all), defaulting to the previous
  private ranges.
- Added an opt-in TRUSTED_HOSTS allow-list: when set, only the listed hosts are
  served and any other Host header is rejected. Unset keeps the historic
  behaviour of serving arbitrary hosts, so existing installs are unaffected.

Resolves #1451
2026-07-08 14:42:12 +01:00

42 lines
1.1 KiB
PHP

<?php
namespace App\Http\Middleware;
use Illuminate\Http\Middleware\TrustHosts as Middleware;
class TrustHosts extends Middleware
{
/**
* Get the host patterns that should be trusted.
*
* The allow-list is read from the TRUSTED_HOSTS env var (comma-separated
* hostnames). When it is unset/empty an empty array is returned so that NO
* host restriction is applied, preserving Heimdall's historic behaviour of
* running on arbitrary hosts. When set, only the listed hosts (and their
* subdomains) are accepted; any other Host header is rejected by Symfony
* with a SuspiciousOperationException (HTTP 400).
*
* @return array
*/
public function hosts()
{
$trustedHosts = env('TRUSTED_HOSTS');
if ($trustedHosts === null || trim((string) $trustedHosts) === '') {
return [];
}
$hosts = [];
foreach (explode(',', (string) $trustedHosts) as $host) {
$host = trim($host);
if ($host !== '') {
$hosts[] = '^(.+\.)?'.preg_quote($host).'$';
}
}
return $hosts;
}
}